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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
JESSE LEWIS WALKER, III,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 47600-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-19-7380
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jesse Lewis Walker, III, has challenged the district court's decisions to sentence him to
ten years, with two years fixed, for felony domestic violence and to deny his motion to reduce
sentence. The State responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
foregoing sentence and in denying the motion to reduce sentence. Mr. Walker submits this reply
brief to respond to the State's arguments that: (1) Mr. Walker's age no longer "excused" his
violent behavior, (2) the praise presented in the letters of support for Mr. Walker were "either
very lightly, or ignorantly, bestowed on a man with Walker's history," (3) Mr. Walker's mental
health issues are "minor, at best" and not mitigating, and (4) the denial of Mr. Walker's Rule 35
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motion was not an abuse of discretion because there was no reason to believe that the State
would have made a different sentencing recommendation had the pending charges been
dismissed prior to sentencing.

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Walker to ten years, with
two years fixed, for felony domestic violence?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Walker's motion to reduce
his sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b )?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Walker To Ten Years, With
Two Years Fixed, For Felony Domestic Violence
Mr. Walker previously asserted that the district court failed to adequately consider
significant mitigating factors, including his abusive childhood, community support, and mental
condition.

The State challenges each of these mitigating factors and asserts that the record

supports the sentence imposed. In particular, the State argues that: (1) Mr. Walker's difficult
childhood was no longer an excuse for his violent behavior because of his age; (2) the statements
made in support of Mr. Walker seemed "either very lightly, or ignorantly, bestowed on a man
with Walker's history"; and (3) Mr. Walker's mental health issues were "minor, at best."
(Respondent's Brief, p.5.)
In support of its argument, the State emphasizes the district court's statement that
Mr. Walker's attempts to control his partners was "a form of abuse." (Respondent's Brief, p.4
(quoting Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.16-p.27, L.14).) The State argues that the sentence imposed was
supported by the record because the domestic violence evaluation had concerns that "[ o]verall,
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Mr. Walker is at a high probability for future domestic violence if the following are not
addressed[:] beliefs in using abusive, intimidating and controlling behaviors in relationships,
mental health concerns, and anxious attachment."

(Respondent's Brief, p.4 (quoting PSI,

p.334).)
First, Mr. Walker asserts that his criminal history, when weighed against the mitigating
factors previously stated, is not significant. Mr. Walker was within the "Moderate" risk category
on the LSI-R and all similarly-situated defendants were sentenced to probation or retained
jurisdiction. 1 (PSI, p.22.)
Prior to Mr. Walker pleading guilty, the victim, AB., submitted a letter to the district
court in which she stated that she had requested that Mr. Walker's charges be reduced because
"he did not choke or strangle me as well as no physical evidence of this." (R., p.74.) In the
domestic battery evaluation, Mr. Walker was found to be at a low/moderate propensity for verbal
aggression, physical aggression, and anger. (PSI, p.328.) The evaluation further clarified that
this case involved the only incident of physical abuse during the parties' relationship. (PSI,
p.334.) According to the evaluation, Mr. Walker only had "minor potential for violence towards
his partner" on the Intimate Justice Scale measure. (PSI, p.331.) Given the findings of the
domestic battery evaluation, Mr. Walker was not a significant threat to the community and the
district court's deviation from the sentences imposed on similar defendants was unreasonable.
The State claims that the district court stated at sentencing that "at some point in life, the
difficulties of childhood are no longer an excuse for violent behavior." (Respondent's Brief, p.5

1

According to the sentencing database information in Mr. Walker's PSI, there have been a total
of eleven other offenders who are similar in age, gender, number of criminal convictions, and
LSI-R score that were sentenced on the same charge as Mr. Walker. Out of those eleven similar
offenders, three of them were sentenced to probation and eight were sentenced to retained
jurisdiction. (PSI, p.22.)
3

(referencing Tr. Vol. II, p.25, L.22-p.26, L.4).) However, Mr. Walker never claimed that his
troubled childhood excused his criminal behavior, but instead presented that information in
mitigation to support a more lenient sentence as authorized under Idaho law. The district court
failed to give adequate weight to Mr. Walker's troubled childhood, and proper consideration of
that factor supported a more lenient sentence.
Second, the State's assertions that the praise for Mr. Walker present in the letters
prepared on his behalf prior to sentencing was done "very lightly, or ignorantly, bestowed on a
man with Walker's history" is mere speculation and is not supported by the record. Twelve
individuals submitted letters in support of Mr. Walker, including: his sister (PSI, p.121), friends
who had known him for years (PSI, pp.125-34), and his boss (PSI, p.139.) The State has
identified no basis to dismiss the opinions of the individuals who know Mr. Walker as a person,
not just as a "rap sheet."
Third, the State describes Mr. Walker's mental health issues as "minor, at best."
(Respondent's Brief, p.5.)

The State references the diagnoses from the mental health

examination2 and then claims that "[ i]t is not clear on the face of the record why this is
mitigating at all."
The mental health examination report clearly identifies Mr. Walker as having serious
mental illness ("SMI") or other mental health needs.

(PSI, p.35.)

That report further

recommended that Mr. Walker engage in psychiatric medication evaluation, management and
education.

(PSI, p.35.)

The report stated that mental health treatment was necessary for

2

The licensed clinical professional counselor (LCPC) that prepared the mental health
examination report offered "rule out" diagnoses of "Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode,
With Psychotic Features ... [and] Generalized Anxiety Disorder." (PSI, p.34.) "The term 'rule
out' is commonly used by IDOC staff or contracted GAIN assessors when the assessor is not
licensed to diagnose mental illness. The use of 'rule out' indicates that the diagnosis as
generated by the GAIN, is provisional." (PSI, p.34.)
4

Mr. Walker "to minimize risk of further deterioration of daily functioning," and that "[w]ithout
some form of treatment, it is likely Jesse will continue to struggle with symptoms and problems
may increase." (PSI, p.35.)
Furthermore, the State ignores the mental health concerns referenced throughout the
domestic battery evaluation. As referenced above, there were only minimal concerns listed in
the evaluation of Mr. Walker using physical aggression or violence towards his partner.
However, the evaluator found that "Mr. Walker does exhibit some preoccupied or fearful
attachment styles normally seen in people who are extremely jealous or possessive." (PSI,
p.334.) The evaluator classified Mr. Walker's jealous preoccupations as a factor that "suggest[s]
mental health concerns that may contribute to future domestic violence."

(PSI, p.334.)

Ironically, the State claims that these mental health concerns were "minor, at best" while also
citing the conclusion to the domestic battery evaluation that "[ o]verall, Mr. Walker is at a high
probability for future domestic violence if the following are not addressed; beliefs in using
abusive, intimidating and controlling behaviors in relationships, mental health concerns, and
anxious attachment." (PSI, p.334.)
The assertion that Mr. Walker's possessive behavior was "a form of abuse" 3 ignored the
significant impact that Mr. Walker's mental illness has had on his relationships and conduct.
The district court made no reference to Mr. Walker's mental illness at sentencing, and the
lengthy prison sentence imposed suggests that the district court did not adequately consider that
mitigating factor.
In sum, Mr. Walker maintains the district court did not exercise reason at sentencing
because it failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case. Proper
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See Tr. Vol. II, p.25, L.22-p.26, L.4.
5

consideration of these factors supports a lesser prison sentence, a rider, or probation. Mr. Walker
submits that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Walker's Rule 35 Motion To
Reduce Sentence
The State argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Walker's motion to reduce sentence because, even though the felony grand theft charge
against Mr. Walker had been dismissed, there were still other misdemeanor charges pending and
"there was therefore no reason to believe that the state would have made a different sentencing
recommendation based on the dismissed charges." (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6 (referencing
R., p.132).) However, the standard for reviewing the denial of a Rule 35 motion is not whether

the State would have made a different sentencing recommendation based on that new
information, but instead whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Walker's
request for leniency. In the Order on Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence, the district stated
that the new felony charge that allegedly occurred just three days prior to sentencing and
involved the same alleged victim as the present case "only minimally-if at all-factored into
the Court's determination of Defendant's sentence." (R., p.132.) The district court asserted that,
"the Court would have imposed the sentence it did regardless of the grand theft charge."
(R., p.132.)
At sentencing, the district court immediately brought up Mr. Walker's arrest on a new
felony charge, without the prosecuting attorney first referencing the new charges, and asked
Mr. Walker's defense counsel whether he agreed that the State was no longer bound by its
obligations under the plea agreement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Walker's defense counsel

6

objected to the State being relieved from its sentencing recommendation and requested additional
time to prepare for sentencing due to the new charges. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.3-14.) There was a
significant discussion between the district court, prosecutor, and defense counsel regarding the
new charges and their implications on the plea agreement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.17-p.10, L.18.)
During her argument at sentencing, the prosecuting attorney referenced the events surrounding
the pending grand theft charge, and Mr. Walker's subsequent arrest on that charge, at least three
separate times. 4 (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, L.16-p.18, L.12.)
The sentence imposed: (1) far exceeded the terms of the plea agreement,5 (2) exceeded
the recommendation of the prosecutor at sentencing, 6 and (3) significantly deviated from the
sentences received from previous, similarly-situated defendants by not giving Mr. Walker an
opportunity for probation or a period of retained jurisdiction. 7

The new and additional

information presented by Mr. Walker supported a reduction in his sentence. Mr. Walker asserts
that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reduce sentence.

4

The prosecutor stated the following in reference to the new charges: (1) "[a]s the Court
understands, on October 18, 2019, he was arrested on that new grand theft charge and also
misdemeanor possession of controlled substance charge" (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.12-15); (2) "[ a]nd
lastly, the fact that while he was pending sentencing in case and out on bond, over the weekend
he was arrested for the grand theft charge and possession, misdemeanor possession, which likely
shows he will continue to commit additional crimes if granted probation" (Tr. Vol. II, p.16,
Ls.14-19); and (3) "Subsection A, that he's an undue risk, that during the period of suspended
sentence or probation he would commit another crime. He's demonstrated that as recently as this
weekend" (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.22-25.)
5
The State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence of seven years, with one year fixed, as
part of the plea agreement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.8-16.) The district court imposed a sentence of
ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II., p.28, Ls.2-8.)
6
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed,
executed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.20-23.)
7
See PSI, p.22.
7

CONCLUSION
Mr. Walker respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24 th day of August, 2020.

Isl Jacob L. Westerfield
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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